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whose downfall it recounts, is curiously like a belated echo—mayhap the transmigrated spirit of the New Harmony community. The same high hopes, the same unpractical purposes, the same incompetent membership, incapable management, jealousy, meanness and failure. Feature by feature the one recalls the other. The world's experience in communistic experiments had taught these new experimenters nothing; they knew little and cared less for history. Reason could not convince them that their plan was unsound for it all looked so plain; and so, with many heart-burnings and much recrimination, this latest community experiment went the way of all communal flesh—its obituary written in no flattering phrases by one of the disenchanted, "Prof. Isaac Broome," as he calls himself on the title-page.

It is not safe to say that this is the last of the small community experiments, for the idea is so attractive to the uninstructed mind, fired by the reformer's zeal. But it is safe to predict that there will be little of that ideal community reform attempted in the future. A far more fascinating kind is found in speculative socialism which has the advantage of not being so discouragingly easy to put to the test. The publisher of the Ruskin book, himself a socialist, shows in the preface what moral the modern socialist draws from these failures of community experiments. If the incapable can not make the capable work for them in a small community, it proves, according to the logic of speculative socialism, that they could do it in a large community. If a little perpetual motion machine will not run, it proves conclusively to some minds that the reason it will not go is that it is not bigger.

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Anticipations of the Reaction of Mechanical and Scientific Progress upon Human Life and Thought. By H. G. WELLS. London, 1902. 8vo, pp. 343.

THE economist, the sociologist, and the student of ethics will each find in this work many fruitful suggestions, amid a rather vast expanse of unnecessary prolixity. Though in the form of prophecy, the treatment deals with tendencies already evident, or at least discernible, and it has the merit of laying stress on objective conditions rather than on mere psychological analysis, the author having a healthy appetite for plain facts in preference to the made dishes of philosophic interpretation.

The main points of the argument are as follows : The shareholding class, with increasing freedom of travel and residence, and consequent weakening of local ties and responsibilities, is likely to become even more frivolous than at present. With the submerged class of incompetents and unemployables at the other end of the social scale it will tend to die out from generation to generation, and will be kept up mainly by recruitment. The rest of society will fall into two groups: first, the scientific and technical producers of every class, from inventors and captains of industry to citizens of ordinary capacity ; and, second, the manipulators of and speculators in stocks, shares, goods, and human nature, including the lawyers, politicians, promoters, market-cornerers, etc. It is interesting to note that this distinction between the industrial producers and the manipulators is virtually the same as that recently developed and emphasized in economic theory by Dr. Veblen. Evidently the distinction cannot always be drawn with exactness, since many business careers involve a mixture of the two classes of activities. But, although the two groups overlap in some degree, the distinction is a vital one, and its neglect by the prevailing schools of economics can have been due only to the tendency to consider only the market value of goods or services to the neglect of their vital value.

Of the above four groups—to return to Wells—the last two will keep up the population and will control business and politics. In ordinary times the manipulators are likely to be the element more largely in control. But a serious war will inevitably bring the industrial producers, or the engineer class in the broadest sense, into control in the states concerned. For warfare is becoming essentially an engineering operation, in the largest sense of engineering ; it is coming to depend no longer upon bravery, numbers, or dash, but upon skill in the utilization of machinery of transportation, in the handling of complicated weapons, large and small, from the warship to the modern rifle, and in organization and direction along lines of the greatest efficiency. The efficient directors of industry will furnish the plans and the industrial efficients will execute them.

The country or federation with the largest body of trained efficients of the scientific-industrial class will be victorious in war and will control world-politics. Wells regards this position as assured to a confederation of English-speaking peoples, headed by the United States. There are, however, as I have hitherto pointed out in these pages, strong reasons for believing that these lines of federation will follow racial as well as linguistic lines, and that the Scandinavians, Hollanders, and

Germans¹ will join with the Anglo-American peoples in a union of the nationalities composed of, or dominated by, the Nordic race and its ideals of freedom and progress. On the other hand, certain English-speaking populations, such as those of India, will take only a passive part in this federation of the Nordic, or larger Anglo-Saxon race.²

An interesting corollary of the view that mechanical or scientific aptitude will be the most important requisite of efficiency in the warfare of the future is the less impressive rôle foreshadowed for such vast, but unprogressive aggregates of population as those represented by the Russian and the Chinese empires.

Russia . . . stagnates, relatively to the western states, under the rule of reactionary intelligencies ; it does not develop, and does not seem likely to develop, the merest beginnings of that great, educated middle class with which the future so enormously rests. The Russia of today is indeed very little more than a vast breeding ground for an illiterate peasantry, and the forecasts of its future greatness entirely ignore that dwindling significance of mere numbers in warfare, which is the clear and necessary consequence of mechanical advance. To a large extent, I believe, the western Slavs will follow the Prussians and Lithuanians, and be incorporated in the urbanization of western Europe, and the remoter portions of Russia seem destined to become — are indeed becoming — an abyss, a wretched and disorderly abyss, that will not even be formidable to the armed and disciplined peoples of the new civilization (p. 271).

¹ Primarily the North Germans, who, however, are likely to swing the South Germans with them. The South Germans, although leaning to the Alpine race type physically, are permeated, from long association, with the Nordic spirit.

²Mr. Wells is, it may be said incidentally, unfamiliar with modern anthropology, and like Mr. Hanna, whose work on the Scotch-Irish is criticised elsewhere, he runs afoul of the prevailing confusion between the linguistic and the anthropological use of such terms as "Teutonic" and "Celtic." Thus he complains (p. 237) that the Norwegian and the Bavarian are both "generalized about as Teutonic." So they are by the philologist, for they both speak Teutonic languages. Again he complains that "the tall and generous Highlander" and the "square-headed Breton" "are Kelts within the meaning of this oil-lamp anthropology." If there is any anthropology extant which teaches this it is certainly oil-lamp, but such an anthropology is a dream conjured up by Mr. Wells's well lubricated imagination. The lumping of the Highland Scotch and the Britons as Celts is a purely linguistic classification. The anthropologists have long been insisting, apparently, however, without effect on the general writer, that language is no test of race. As regards the particular groups referred to the Norwegian is prevailingly Teutonic, or better, Nordic; the Highlander is Nordic with an intermixture of darker race, probably allied to the Mediterranean, certainly not Celtic; the Breton is mainly Celtic, or better, Alpine of race; and the Bavarian is a combination of Celtic and Teutonic.

This is certainly an unusual view, especially for an Englishman, of the prospects of the Russian power in Europe and Asia. In spite of the present backwardness of the Russian civilization, it seems more than likely that with her vast territory and prolific population, she will, perhaps in combination with the Chinese, prove so formidable a rival as to be met only by a comprehensive alliance of the Anglo-Saxon-Germanic peoples.

Our author fails, moreover, to take cognizance of the possibilities of a peaceful or industrial victory by peoples of lower nervous organization and standards of living like the Chinese, by infiltration through the less thickly settled western countries, and by colonization of the vast regions of the tropics, which the north Europeans are physiologically unable to populate. This is another direction in which Mr. Wells's views would be broadened by some acquaintance with anthropology not of the oil-lamp brand.

The scientific-mechanical efficient, who will come through the stress of war to control the future dominant state, will be from natural bent and training suited to bring order out of the chaotic standards of religious morality, and politics, characteristic of the ascendancy of the irresponsible shareholding class and their satellites and imitators, the financial and political manipulators. They will probably conceive of human life as in some sense a realization of a world-purpose, or at any rate as more serious and significant than the mere pursuit of wealth and pleasure. Certainly not less moral than previous generations, they will substitute a selectionist morality for the conventional morality of the present. It is by no means certain that monogamy will be the only form of family organization recognized as legitimate. Physiological knowledge will be utilized toward aiding nature to eliminate in each generation the vicious and base types. The basis of morality will be race improvement. The ethical system will be shaped "to check the procreation of base and servile types, of fear-driven and cowardly souls, of all that is mean and ugly and bestial," and "to favor the procreation of what is fine and efficient in humanity—beautiful and strong bodies, clear and powerful minds, and a growing body of knowledge."

These views are, of course, none other than those that have been urged for the last twenty years by the selectionist school of ethics and sociology, and in fact they are in some sense as old as Plato. But in view of the predominance of merely conventional views, the possibilities of selectionist morality need constant exposition, and for this reason the present volume, in spite of its many defects, is to be welcomed.

C. C. C.